The ‘Limits of Pure Reason’ in Decision-Making: Dupré and Damasio’s Basic Thesis

The paper firstly outlines the theoretical and methodological
framework of the “theory of rational choice”, as it has emerged in various
cognitive and social sciences. Above all, in economics, it has become the
dominant paradigm, attracting various criticisms. In particular, we will address
two authors, John Dupré, philosopher of science, and Antonio Damasio,
neuroscientist. Albeit from different perspectives, both scholars question the
assumption of this theory, according to which man tends to make his own
decisions in a purely rational way, aiming selfishly to achieve the maximum
usefulness. Conversely, they put forward the hypothesis, supported by the
studies of the two authors, that “pure reason” in itself is insufficient to make
entirely rational decisions. Only the involvement of the bodily and emotional
sphere and of social principles allows man to make rational, thoughtful choices,
as Damasio’s clinical cases show. This corrective, in our opinion, is part of the
wider movement – already experimented in the physical, biological, medical,
and didactic fields during the 20th century – tending to overcome the Cartesian
subject/object separation, introducing the variable subject into the discipline